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introduction
Foreign fighter mobilisation is not a new phenomenon. However, it has only 
become a serious political issue worldwide with the rise of the Islamic State 
(IS). More than 42,000 people from 120 countries have travelled to Iraq and Syria 
between 2011 and 2016.2
Previous studies on IS have been largely concerned with the growth of the 
phenomenon in the West.3 Meanwhile, countries with recent experience in 
violence have also contributed to the numbers in Europe but received less 
attention from scholars and security experts. More than 900 people from the 
Western Balkans have joined the ranks of IS and other radical groups.4 364 of 
them originate from Kosovo, the youngest country in the region, born out of the 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
This Strategic Update looks at the emergence of foreign fighter cells in societies 
with a recent war experience. Did foreign fighters from Kosovo join IS because of 
their experience of conflict and civil war at home?
To answer this question, I not only examined offical documents and media 
reports, I conducted semi-structured interviews with returnees – people who 
had traveled from Kosovo to Syria as foreign fighters and back – as well as their 
relatives and friends, and the local communities they came from including police 
and religious leaders.5
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Theories of why people become  
foreign fighters
Why people become foreign fighters has been the guiding 
question for scholars studying radicalisation  
and recruitment for jihadi movements. From ideology 
to the search for belonging and poor socio-economic 
conditions, researchers have explored different sets of 
triggering factors. 
Petter Nesser’s typology of jihadi terrorists in Europe 
has four categories of fighter: entrepreneurs, protégés, 
misfits, and drifters.6 The emphasis is on entrepreneurs 
and their protégés who proactively seek to build organised 
extremist circles at the local level through socialisation, 
manipulation, and recruitment of targeted individuals.7 
Building on these categories to think about why people are 
attracted to extremist groups, my research distinguishes 
between identity producers (entrepreneurs and protégés) 
and identity seekers (misfits and drifters). Identity 
provides individuals with the means to see themselves 
linked by common values, interests and goals.8 Young 
people looking for a identity to feel belonging to a group, 
and those offering an identity and a “home” are both part 
of the story of creating foreign IS fighters. 
IS fighters from Kosovo   
Overall 364 Kosovars are known to have travelled to Syria 
and Iraq between 2012 and 2016 to join different radical 
and rebel groups. The majority of them ended up either in 
the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra or IS.9 196 are believed to be 
still in Syria, while 133 have returned home by 2016.10 76 
people were killed in the conflict zone, while at least 40 
children were born there to women from Kosovo.11 At least 
253 of all “war travelers” were men, 55 women and 36 
minors. More than 1/3 of the foreign fighters from Kosovo 
were in their early twenties prior their departure to Syria, 
thus, they were too young to have had previous fighting 
experience from the Kosovo war.13  
More than 1/3 
of the foreign 
fighters from 
Kosovo were 
in their early 
twenties prior  
their departure  
to Syria.
‘
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The majority of the male foreign fighters 
have moderate education. Many were 
unemployed or held a low socio-economic 
status prior their departure.14 Most fighters 
from Kosovo have joined either IS or Jabhat 
al Nusra, the branch of al-Qaeda in Syria.
Nearly 20 years after the war, Kosovo 
remains largely characterised by the 
features of a post-conflict society. The 
Kosovo war (1998-1999) was fought by 
the forces of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime 
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
Following 1999 NATO strikes against the 
Yugoslav army and after 9 years under UN 
control, Kosovo declared its independence 
from Serbia on Feb 17, 2008. The young 
Balkan state is poor and underdeveloped, 
struggling with high unemployment, poverty, 
endemic corruption and visa regime 
isolation. Along with weak economic 
and political institutions, residual ethnic 
divisions and societal disorientation  
have become a fruitful ground for  
external influences. 
 
The growth of extremist 
ideology in Kosovo
In the aftermath of the war, radical 
religious ideas grew in the region under the 
camouflage of humanitarian organisations. 
Middle Eastern charities became active in 
Kosovo, helping local populations to re-build 
private and public infrastructure. Along with 
the financial aid, they were responsible for 
dissemination of more rigid religious ideas 
and practices.15
For instance, more than thirty Koranic 
schools were established in the rural 
areas of Kosovo with funding from Saudi 
foundations.16 Meanwhile, religious scholars 
undertook frequent visits to Kosovo as 
missionaries. Over time, conservative 
religious thought increased.  
Following the war, Kosovars have been 
more inclined to identify with their ethnic 
Albanian identity rather than with the 
newborn national identity. As Kursani (2018) 
points out: “There is a whole generation 
to whom their own identity is not clear 
anymore - are they Albanians or Kosovars, 
what is their flag, their symbol?”.17 Since 
the goal to have an independent state was 
accomplished, the impetus of the national 
cause has diminished but without fully 
satisfying people’s need for belonging and 
identification.18 As the national identity 
seems to be fragile, another became more 
salient, the religious one. 
The Takfir ideology (sanctioning violence 
against countries and people who are 
not Islamic enough) promoted today by 
IS and other extremist groups arrived 
in the Western Balkans around 2005. 
The phenomenon is not home-grown to 
Kosovo, neither to the other countries in 
the region.19 It appeared in the Western 
Balkans through a number of imams from 
the region who, before and during the war, 
got their education from Middle Eastern 
religious institutions. At that time, some 
of them established close connection with 
Takfir circles, mainly in Egypt. Those Balkan 
imams were influenced by the combination 
of “revolutionary Islam” (with roots in Egypt) 
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with fundamentalist Islam (originating from Saudi Arabia) 
employed by Al Qaeda and later the Islamic State.20 
Once they returned to the Western Balkans, they began 
spreading their radical views. 
 
Memories of the Kosovo War and 
Recruitment 
With the outbreak of the Syrian war, the key message 
was: Islam is under threat locally and globally; it is every 
Muslim’s duty to join the war in Syria.21 The prospect of 
going to Syria as a foreign fighter became popular among 
young Kosovars who were seeking strong indentities. 
Some of those who traveled to Syria and were interviewed 
for this research seek to present themselves as “wanna-
be” soldiers, as they were between 8 and 14 years old 
when the Kosovo war broke out. Since they did not have 
the chance to participate and defend the community 
because they were too young then, the Syrian war 
provided them with an opportunity for a second chance.  
The link between personal war memories and the ongoing 
events in Syria was rationalised by both identity seekers 
and identity producers, and eventually became a trigger 
for many to travel to the battlefield: 
“It was very sensitive for us because everything  
they were living through at that time [in Syria],  
we had it before in Kosovo”  
(Source C, a returnee). 
“I was frustrated during the war, I wanted to be part 
of it but I was only 13 years old…going to Syria, I 
sought to have the experience to take the gun and 
protect the community, something that I couldn’t 
do during the Kosovo war…I cannot simply stay and 
watch people suffering. I want to do something for 
the community. It makes me feel useful”  
(Source A, a returnee). 
 
The prospect of 
going to Syria as 
a foreign fighter 
became popular 
among young 
Kosovars who 
were seeking 
strong identities. 
‘
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“My family was well off, however, during the war we’ve 
lost everything. My father became an alcoholic, one of 
my sisters started taking drugs. I felt isolated. It was 
May 2007, I remember, I was walking down the street, I 
passed the mosque in Dardania district in Pristina and 
heard the Azzan (the call to prayer). I was only 15 years 
old. I went inside I prayed for the first time in my life”  
(Source B, an ex-Takfir follower, among the students of 
a radical imam in Kosovo).
Another IS fighter, interviewed while serving his sentence in 
one of the Kosovo’ prisons, shared that he keeps a strong 
war memory of seeing the mother of a friend killed before 
his eyes. In his own words the experience of his community 
being in need in the past made him believe that he should 
“return the gesture” and help people in Syria.22 War memories, 
therefore, were effectively exploited by identity producers on 
the ground.
The narrative of “failed nationalism” in Kosovo employed by 
local recruiters relies on people’s disappointment with the 
current state of domestic politics:
“They first isolated you from your family. They ask you if 
your family pray. If not, they are called unbelievers. The 
next step is to isolate you from the state, by saying, this 
is not your state, and it is controlled by the Americans. 
It does not represent you. The state is against you; 
therefore, you should hate it.”  
(Source H) 
These words seemed to be appealing to people who 
sought to be part of something politically and ideologically 
significant, a project that goes beyond the borders  
of Kosovo. 
While there was targeting from identity producers, identity-
seekers were also active in seeking to become foreign 
fighters. Though they were not necessarily part of radical 
religious circles, they were exposed to the narrative of Muslim 
victimhood, and the war in Syria: 
 
In the 
aftermath of 
the war, radical 
religious 
ideas grew 
in the region 
under the 
camouflage of 
humanitarian 
organisations.
‘
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“I would not say I was recruited, I would say, I was 
betrayed. I told the guy who convinced me to go to 
Syria that I don’t want to be part of Al Qaeda. But 
they knew where they were sending me by giving 
me exactly the contacts I got…I’ve never denied that 
religion plays an important role in my life. However, 
it was not religion that made me go to Syria. It was 
the dictatorship there and my desire to help Syrian 
people. I became religious after the war, I started 
to pray, but I’ve never had sympathy for extremist 
organizations. I’ve never had sympathy for Al Qaeda, 
I knew they had this wrong ideology.”  (Source A) 
The geography of recruitment:  
cells and ‘radicalisation hubs’
Despite the presence of socio-economic and ideational 
factors, the most striking finding in studying foreign fighter 
recruitment in Kosovo is the importance of religious 
leaders in specific locations. Recruitment, like politics,  
is local. 
Whether intiated by charismatic ‘identity producers’ or 
created by gatherings of ‘identiy seekers’, foreign fighters 
from Kosovo were products of local cells that emerged 
around local leaders. 
Places where identity producers and identity seekers 
met played a vital role in the process of foreign fighter 
mobilisation in Kosovo. Recruitment happened in 
hidden spaces, as well as in public areas such as bars 
and cafes.23 Radical imams delivered sermons and had 
discussions with their followers afterwards. A few legal 
and illegal mosques, religious NGOs, and private spaces 
were the key spots for these meetings. For example, two 
religious organizations in Kacanik (a town near the border 
with Macedonia), ‘Parimi‘ and ‘Islamic Youth-Kacanik‘, 
contributed to foreign fighter mobilisation.24
Another type of gathering was a religious summer school 
that first took place in 2012.25 The two figures behind 
it were two of the most prominent radical imams, later 
 
Various forms 
of activism 
have shaped 
two distinct 
types of identity 
producers: local 
influencers and 
messengers from 
the battlefield.
‘
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sentenced for recruitment. There were 
about 50 participants, who had the chance 
to connect with each other, share ideas, 
books and other materials.  
One participant said:
“It took place in a dormitory, where 
we slept and prayed in the mornings, 
then we had lectures where they 
were teaching us the Quran…
they were telling us that we were 
not allowed to work for any state 
structures, such as policy or military; 
that we should not vote; that women 
should wear burka…they were 
telling us about jihad, they were 
condemning Shia, Christians, Jews, 
they were also talking against the 
Islamic community in Kosovo, saying 
that they are puppets of America.” 
(Source D) 
Types of local leadership
Various forms of activism have shaped 
two distinct forms of local leadership 
(identity producers): local influencers and 
messengers from the battlefield, as these 
categories are not mutually exclusive. 
The first type included charismatic radical 
preachers, who also played the role of 
recruiters on the “supply side“  of the 
recruitment channel. They used to give 
religious sermons in and outside mosques 
and had extensive discussions with their 
followers about injustices against Muslims 
and the virtue of jihad. They combined a 
religious emphasis on “back to the roots” 
Islam with rejection of the state and official 
religious institutions in Kosovo.26 In their 
speeches, they sought to build an identity-
based link between their local followers  
and a global religious community by 
creating a sense of belonging, loyalty and 
religious duty.
Messengers from the battlefield, on the 
other hand, combined ideological influence 
on their community with real actions. 
These were top commanders in the ranks 
of IS, active in online propaganda from the 
battlefield and positioned on the “demand 
side“ of the foreign fighter channel from 
Kosovo. They appeared in videos on 
social media addressing the audience 
from the “epicenter” of the war theatre. 
The first videos in the Albanian language 
from the conflict zone appeared in 2013.  
The key messenger from the battlefield, 
Lavdrim Muhaxheri, took part in a series 
of propaganda materials, including videos, 
photographs, and interviews, openly 
advocating for jihad. 
In a late 2013 video, he and another 
Albanian-speaking man called on ethnic 
Albanians from all parts of the Balkans 
to join the war against the Assad-regime 
and other “infidels”.27 In a January 2014 
video, Muhaxhiri speaks surrounded by 
men holding national passports. He calls 
on Albanians to join him to fight taghut and 
kuffar: “We praise Allah for his blessing and 
for gathering us together with the lions of IS 
from all around the world”.28 He threatens 
all “unbelievers” with slaughter, holding 
a knife. The video ends with everybody 
tearing up their Kosovo passports as a sign 
of loyalty: “We are all Muslims”.29
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Both types acted as authority figures and played vital roles 
in the recruitment process, as their functions sometimes 
overlap. The research of individual biographies illustrates 
the significance of their informal-authority role over time in 
building IS foreign fighter cells. Though they were not given 
any authority from the central IS leadership, they gained 
prominence through interaction with identity seekers. 
They shaped the identity and enemy perception of those 
who seek to identify with a greater cause or a broader 
community.
Mapping the evidence 
The major source of ideological influence that sparked 
foreign fighter mobilisation from Kosovo was a circle of 
radical preachers from Macedonia and Kosovo, who share 
similar backgrounds of studies in the Middle East and 
have been particularly active following the war. Though 
they differ in their ideological focuses and target different 
audiences, they began to cooperate over time driven by 
shared goals.30 The interactions between them determined 
the trajectory of their activities, and therefore, the creation 
of radical cells in a few neighboring municipalities that 
became famous for “producing” foreign fighters after 2012. 
By December 2016, 54 individuals from the southeastern 
part of Kosovo travelled to Syria and Iraq.31
The map of foreign fighter mobilisation in Kosovo 
shows that cells emerged where radical imams were 
particularly active. A few municipalities near the border 
with Macedonia have disproportionately high mobilisation 
rate compared to the rest of country.32 Though all 
Albanian populated municipalities have been affected 
by the phenomenon, these spots have made significant 
contributions to the foreign fighter contingent. 
More than 1/3 of the male foreign fighters originate from 
the following places: Hani I Elezit, Kacanic, Mitrovica, 
Gjilan and Viti, and the first two have a joined contribution 
of 30 fighters (but only account for 2.4% of Kosovo’s 
 
The map of 
foreign fighter 
mobilisation 
in Kosovo 
shows that 
cells emerged 
where radical 
imams were 
particularly 
active.
‘
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Map 1. Number of Kosovo men (253) who travelled to Syria and Iraq by municipality 
Source: UNDP. 2017. Understanding Push and Pull Factors 
in Kosovo: Primary Interviews with Returned Foreign 
Fighters and their Families. 
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population).33 According to 2017 UNDP Report, the southeast municipalities 
Gjilan, Ferizaj, Kacanik, Hani i Elezit, Viti and Kamenica account for about 35% of 
those who travelled to the conflict zone.34 
As mentioned, lack of working institutions, high levels of unemployment, and 
lack of opportunity to integrate into society are among the structural pre-
conditions considered contributing to foreign-fighter mobilisation. Although 
these factors do not differ greatly from one municipality to another, the 
southeast part of Kosovo, near the border with Macedonia is generally poorer, 
underdeveloped, socially and religiously more conservative. These features 
of the region were used by radical networks to manipulate and mobilize 
youngsters. Furthermore, identity producers found a suitable ground for 
radicalisation among young people, who go through identity crises, deal with 
feelings of hopelessness, feel like losers without any economic prospects for 
the future.35 Both propaganda and poverty fit into these gaps and shaped the 
process of foreign fighter identity building in small local cells. 
Conclusion
Individuals from Kosovo play different roles in the process of foreign fighter 
mobilisation. Local cells have emerged exactly in places where entrepreneurs 
and protégés have been active. Their targeting efforts have led to the 
emergence of ”radicalisation hubs“ across Kosovo where smaller or bigger 
ideological circles have produced clusters of people who travelled to Syria or 
Iraq individually or in a group between 2012 and 2016. Research and interviews 
testify to a number of local cells, well connected to one another, where identity 
producers and identity seekers interacted. 
The emergence of foreign fighter cells is the result of a long-term targeted 
radicalisation and efforts by extremist circles managed by identity producers. 
Identity producers use collective grievances to enable narratives of victimization, 
while exploiting a mixture of political ideology and religious beliefs, war 
memories and ethnic sentiments to mobilize followers and justify violence in the 
name of a cause. Identity seekers, on the other hand, describe their reasons for 
traveling to the conflict zone as morally and religiously justifiable. 
So while Kosovo’s specific history of conflict does play a part in motivating 
foreign fighters to travel to Syria, the major effect is from the organisation of 
local groups. This should be an important lesson for policymakers across the 
globe to prevent the further rise of extremism. 
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How does a conflict far away speak to men 
and women in Kosovo? What does this 
say about the memories of conflict in their 
own country? In this Strategic Update Asya 
Metodieva explores these questions through 
an in-depth analysis of both quantitative and 
oral sources, shedding light on the interaction 
of what are termed ‘identity producers’ and 
‘identity seekers’. 
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